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NOTES
The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3):
A Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?
INTRODUCTION

Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C.
1985(3), 1 was one of several civil rights statutes generated by the
Forty-second Congress in the flurry of legislative activity during the
Reconstruction era. 2 This statute provides a civil cause of action
against individuals who conspire to deprive "any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws."3 Section 1985(3) was one of the first statutes passed pursuant to section 5 of the then newly enacted fourteenth
amendment. 4
1. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). In relevant part, this statute provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the high·
way or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws . . • in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982). Note that prior to 1982 the act was codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c).
A number of sources discussed in this Note use this designation.
2. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323
(1952).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982). Before the "equal protection" language was inserted,
§ 1985(3) was a criminal statute that punished "any [conspiratorial] act in violation of the rights,
privileges, or immunities of another person, which • . . would • • . constitute the crime of either
murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury ..•• " CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) [hereinafter cited as CONG. GLOBE, App.]. Critics of the
statute argued that this broad language was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to
enact. The major complaint was that the original bill impinged on the states' jurisdiction over
criminal offenses by punishing purely private criminal acts. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 188 (1871) [hereinafter cited as CONG. GLOBE] (statement of Rep. Willard) ("[I]t occurred
to me, as it occurred to many other Republicans upon this floor, that this provision gave to the
United States courts jurisdiction of every criminal offense that could be committed anywhere
within the limits of the United States; that it practically abolished the criminal jurisdiction of the
States . . . •"). See also Note, Federal Civil Action Against Private Individuals for Crimes Involv·
ing Civil Rights, 74 YALE L.J. 1462, 1467-68 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Civil
Action]; Comment, A Construction ofSection 1985(c) in Light of its Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 402, 407-20 (1979). To avoid subverting the entire criminal jurisdiction of the states,
sponsors of the bill inserted the equal protection language, which was intended to limit the stat·
ute to the "prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American
citizens." CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 478 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). See also Note,
Section 1985(c): A Viable Alternative to Title VII for Sex-Based Employment Discrimination, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 378 (1978).
4. CONG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 69.
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Despite its broad language, the statute was rendered largely impotent soon after its enactment by a series of hostile Supreme Court decisions. 5 It languished in relative obscurity until 1971, when the
Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 6 breathed new life into the
statute by relaxing a formerly rigid state action requirement. 7
In relaxing the state action requirement, however, the Court emphasized that the inherent limits of section 1985(3) prevent it from
being read as a "general federal tort law": 8 "The language requiring
intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial or perhaps otherwise classbased invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. "9 In doing so, the Court laid to rest the concerns of those who
feared that section 1985(3) might be construed to provide a federal
civil remedy for victims of virtually any crime committed by two or
more individuals. Unfortunately, the Court refused to expand further
on what classifications besides race would meet this new
requirement. 10
5. See generally Gressman, supra note 2. The first blow to § 1985(3) occurred in 1882 when
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), struck down the criminal
counterpart of§ 1985(3), Rev. Stat. § 5519 (1875), as being beyond the constitutional power of
Congress to enact. Specifically, the Court held that since the act was not limited to official action, it was beyond the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Harris, 106 U.S. at 638-39. This
decision was reaffirmed in Baldwin v. Frank, 120 U.S. 678, 685 (1887).
The scope of§ 1985(3) was again limited in 1951 by the Supreme Court's decision in Collins
v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). The Court, in keeping with past precedent, e.g., The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), imposed a state action requirement on § 1985(3) causes of
action. The plaintiffs in Collins were members of a political group opposing the Marshall Plan.
The group brought suit after one of their meetings was disrupted by a group of American Legionaires. The Court ruled that "such private discrimination is not inequality before the law unless
there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so."
Collins, 341 U.S. at 661.
6. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
7. The plaintiffs in Griffin were a trio of black citizens who had been assaulted by a band of
white citizens who believed (mistakenly) that the three were civil rights workers. The injured
plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to § 1985(3) claiming that the defendants had conspired to deprive them of their thirteenth amendment right to free travel. The circuit court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim on the grounds that there had been no showing of state
action. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that no state action was required when § 1985(3) was used in conjunction with the thirteenth amendment. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105. This action was in harmony with the general trend
of the era to "accord [the civil rights statutes] a sweep as broad as [their] language." Griffin, 403
U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)).
8. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. According to the Court, "[t]he constitutional shoals that would
lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the Congressional purpose - by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind
of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the [amendment inserting
the 'equal protection' language into the statute]." See note 3 supra for a discussion of the origins
of the "equal protection" language.
9. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis in original). The Court listed the following additional
requirements for sustaining a cause of action under the statute: (1) The existence of a conspiracy;
(2) an act furthering the conspiracy; and (3) consequential (a) injury to person or property or (b)
deprivation of a right or privilege of citizenship. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03.
10. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9, where the Court stated: "We need not decide, given the
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After Griffin, suits brought under section 1985(3) proliferated. 11
Working without clear direction, lower courts formulated a patchwork of often irreconcilable guidelines to determine what groups met
the class-based animus requirement. 12 Some courts eschewed definite
criteria, relying instead on ad hoc determinations.13
The Supreme Court was presented with an excellent opportunity
to establish guidelines for the class-based animus requirement in Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny. 14 In
Novotny, a male bank employee brought claims under section 1985(3)
and title VII alleging that he had been fired because of his vocal opposition to his employer's discrimination against women. The Third Circuit upheld his complaint, ruling that "sex discrimination [is] within
the categories of animus condemned by section 1985(3)." 15 The
Supreme Court avoided the class-based animus problem, however, by
reversing on the grounds that title VII statutory rights could not be
asserted vis a vis section 1985(3).16
Novotny was a relatively narrow ruling that gave lower courts little
facts ofthis case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than
racial bias would be actionable under [§ 1985(3)]."
11. Among the cases denying § 1985(3) protection to specific groups were Browder v. Tip·
ton, 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1980) (picket-line crossers); Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256
(6th Cir. 1980) (fired employees); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979) (homosexuals); Lessman v. McCormick, 591F.2d605 (10th Cir. 1979) (debtors); Harrison
v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358 (1st Cir. 1975) (residential property owners); Dombrowski v. Dowling,
459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (criminal lawyers).
Cases in which the class-based animus requirement was met include Conroy v. Conroy, 575
F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978) (American Indians); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th
Cir.) (political demonstrators), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d
608 (6th Cir. 1973) (supporters of political candidates); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir.
1972) (white family members).
A division of opinion arose on the status of women under § 1985(3). Compare Pcndrcll v.
Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (granting women protection), with Knott v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 389 F. Supp. 856, 857 (E.D. Mo. 1975) ("[T]he remedies granted by •• ,
[§ 1985] deal only with discrimination on the basis of race.").
12. See notes 30-96 infra and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Conroy v.
Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978); Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971);
Gomez v. City of West Chicago, 506 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
14. 442 U.S. 366 (1979). For a discussion of this case see Banks, The Scope of Section
1985(3) in Light of Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny: Too
Little Too Late?, 9 HAsnNGS CoNsr. L.Q. 579 (1982); Recent Development - Civil Rights Employment Discrimination - Section 1985(c) Unavailable to Vindicate Title VII Rights, 65
CoRNELL L. REv. 114 (1979).
15. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 584 F.2d 1235, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1978),
revd. on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). Even though the plaintiff Novotny was male, the
court ruled he had proper standing to bring a§ 1985(3) action because "members of a conspiracy
to deprive women of equal rights are liable under section 1985(3) to persons who are injured in
furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whether male or female." 584 F.2d at 1244. The
Supreme Court did not reach this issue.
16. The Court held that § 1985(3) is a purely remedial statute that is only available "when
some otherwise defined federal right - to equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and
immunities under the laws-is breached by a conspiracy." Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376. The Court
then dismissed the suit, ruling that § 1985(3) cannot be invoked to redress violations of title VII.
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guidance. In the more recent case of United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 17 however, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to address the requirement. The plaintiffs in Scott
were a group of nonunion construction workers who had been
harassed and assaulted by members of the local construction union.
The district court18 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit19
entered judgment for the plaintiffs, ruling that nonunion workers are
members of an "economic class" and that economic classes can meet
the class-based animus requirement. 20
The Supreme Court reversed, in a five-to-four decision, holding
that it could not "construe 1985(3) to reach conspiracies motivated by
economic or commercial animus." 21 Such a construction, the Court
reasoned, "is at best only arguable and surely not compelled by either
language or legislative history." 22 Although Scott's holding was actually quite narrow, 23 the tone24 of the decision, its considerable dicta, 25
and the lack of other authoritative guidance suggest that Scott will
442 U.S. at 378. To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would allow a complainant to circumvent the detailed enforcement and procedural provisions of title VII. 442 U.S. at 375-76.
17. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
18. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajfd., 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982),
revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
19. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
20. Scott, 680 F.2d at 994-95. The district court based its decision on its conclusion that the
plaintiffs were members of a protected "discernible class" possessing "common characteristics of
an inherent nature." 461 F. Supp. at 229-30. See also notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
21. Scott, 463 U.S. at 838.
22. Scott, 463 U.S. at 838.
23. The Court withheld judgment on whether § 1985(3) goes "any farther than its central
concern - combating the violent and other efforts of the Klan and its allies to resist and to
frustrate the intended [e]ffects of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments."
Scott, 463 U.S. at 837.
24. As several subsequent decisions have recognized, the Court in Scott evinced a strong
reluctance to expand § 1985(3) protections much beyond racial animus. See Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[F]rom Scott we get a signal that the
classes covered by 1985 should not be extended beyond those already expressly provided by the
Court."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1601 (1984); see also Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F.
Supp. 13, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig &
Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 674 n.8 (N.D. III. 1984); Nilan v. DeMeo, 575 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).
25. Several pages of the Scott opinion discussed the applicability of§ 1985(3) to conspiracies
motivated by animus against a class member's political associations. Scott, 463 U.S. at 835-37.
This dictum has been cited by several courts to support rejection of§ 1985(3) claims brought by
political organizations. See Grimes v. Smith, 585 F. Supp. 1084 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (two voters
and defeated candidate alleging election fraud not protected); Schultz v. Sundberg, 577 F. Supp.
1491 (D. Alaska 1984) (members of state House of Representatives majority coalition not protected), ajfd., 159 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1985); Nilan v. DeMeo, 575 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(traffic court workers allegedly fired for political beliefs not protected); Fiske v. Lockheed Ga.
Co., 568 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (employees allegedly fired for Socialist activities not
protected). But cf Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (political groups advocating
civil rights for blacks protected), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F.
Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (same).

92

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:88

have a substantial impact on lower courts' attempts to delineate the
scope of section 1985(3).
This Note focuses on Scott's impact on attempts to determine what
groups fall within the statute. Part I examines the various class-based
animus formulas generated by the circuits since Griffin and the potential impact of Scott on these formulas. Part II argues that the key to
understanding the scope of the class-based animus requirement lies in
traditional fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis.
I.

THE LOWER COURTS' REsPONSES TO GRIFFIN

In the absence of a clear, authoritative explication of section
1985(3), the various circuits have struggled to generate consistent
guidelines for delineating the scope of the class-based animus requirement. 26 Among the courts that have attempted to formulate working
criteria, three general approaches emerged in the period between Griffin and Scott: (1) "clearly defined groups"; 27 (2) "immutable characteristics"/"historically pervasive discrimination"; 28 and (3) "equal
protection"/"political association analysis." 29 Of these three, only the
"immutable characteristics" and "equal protection" approaches appear to have survived Scott.

A.

Clearly Defined Groups

Following the Griffin decision, several lower courts extended section 1985(3) protection to "clearly defined groups."30 Support for this
26. For a pre-Scott summary of the various class-based animus standards of§ 1985(3), see
Note, The Class Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S. C. § 1985(c): A Suggested Approach, 64
MINN. L. R.Ev. 635 (1980). Many courts did not try to establish definite criteria, but relied
instead on ad hoc determinations. See note 13 supra.
27. See, e.g., Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468
F.2d 1228, 1233 (1st Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382
(6th Cir. 1972); cf Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (class-based animus requirement met if there "exist[s] an identifiable body with which [the plaintiff is associated]"), vacated
en bane per curiam as moot 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978),
revd. on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Schnabel v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 563
F. Supp. 1030, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (nonunion employees not covered); Horne v. Farrell, 560 F.
Supp. 219, 226 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (unrepresented litigants not covered).
29. See, e.g., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1110 (1981); Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1980); Desantis v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
30. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973). Courts adopting this approach
have described the nexus between class members necessary to establish a protected "clearly de·
fined group" in a number of ways. See, e.g., Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Tex. 1978)
(classes "having common characteristics of an inherent nature" are protected), ajfd., 680 F.2d
979 (5th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983);
Harrison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358 (1st Cir. 1975) (classes defined by "invidious" criteria are
protected); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d
833, 840 (8th Cir. 1975) (classes that have "an intellectual nexus which has somehow been communicated to, among and by the members of the group" are protected) (quoting Westberry v.
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broad view comes from both the statutory language31 and the legislative history of section 1985(3).32 This approach and its various permutations33 have been justified solely by reference to the broad "any
person or class of persons" language used in section 1985(3). As
stated by one court:
The Act forbids any conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving . . . any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws . . . ."
While it is true, as the legislative history reveals, that the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 was immediately aimed at the protection of blacks in the
South after the Civil War, Congress chose the words "any person or
class of persons." It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that the
protection of Section 1985(3) extends not only to blacks and other racial
minorities, but to any person or group that is the object of invidious
discrimination. 34

This broad view is also supported by the generally expansive scope
accorded to section 1985(3) by radical and moderate proponents of the
bill during the 1871 congressional debates. 35 The remarks of the Senate floor manager of the bill, George Edmunds of Vermont, reflect this
attitude:
We do not undertake in this Bill to interfere with what might be called a
private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set
of men against another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State
courts against men for burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it
should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because
he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Methodist, or
because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Vermonter, . . . then this
Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 215, vacated en bane per curiam as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th
Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
Courts adopting the approach that classes that are the object of invidious discrimination are
protected have defined "invidious" very broadly. In Azar, 456 F.2d at 1386 n.5, for example, the
court indicated in dicta that white middle class family members could be protected by the statute
if they were subjected to "invidious discrimination." In Ha"ison, 519 F.2d at 1360, the court
implied that a "record of malice" against a particular group would be sufficient to establish the
requisite invidiousness. Cf. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 912 (6th Cir.) (political
demonstrators protected because "[a] more invidious classification than that between persons
who support government officials and their policemen and those who are critical of them is
difficult to imagine"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
31. See Azar, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972); note 34 infra and accompanying text.
32. See Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 229 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajfd., 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1982), revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983); notes 36-38 infra
and accompanying text.
33. See note 30 supra.
34. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972) (dictum) (emphasis omitted); see
also Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973). The term "invidious" has been defined very broadly by courts adopting this approach. See note 30 supra.
35. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 73 (statement of Rep. Blair) (Act's object
is "the securing to the people of the several states the rights, privileges, and immunities which
pertain to them as citizens"); 141 (statement of Rep. Shanks); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 3, at
395 (statement of Rep. Rainey) ("I desire that so broad and liberal a construction be placed upon
its provisions as will insure protection to the humblest citizen, without regard to rank, creed, or
color."); see generally Note, supra note 3, at 407-20 & 429-32.

94

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:88

section could reach it. 3 6

This quote has been relied upon by a number of courts espousing
broader views of section 1985(3). 37
Even before Scott, the clearly defined group approach and it~ permutations were criticized as overly broad and unworkable. 3 8 The majority in Scott, attending to these criticisms, rejected the lower courts'
expansive reading of the class-based animus requirement. The district
court had relied solely on the "clearly defined group" logic in ruling
that nonunion workers comprise a class protected by the statute. 39
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the district court's conclusion,
ruling that section 1985(3) could not be extended to protect groups
defined solely by their economic activities. 40 Thus, while the Court
did not expressly reject the "clearly defined group" logic, the Scott
holding is plainly inconsistent with any approach that results in such a
broad category of potentially protected classes.
Similarly, the Supreme Court refused to view the legislative history
supporting this approach as dispositive. The Court recognized that
some legislative history, especially Senator Edmunds' remarks, indicated an intention to provide a broader reach for the statute.41 Noting, however, that all of the substantive drafting of this statutory
36. CoNG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 567.
37. See, e.g., Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 388 (2d Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686
F.2d 1346, 1357 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); Browder v. Tipton, 630
F.2d 1149, 1151 (6th Cir. 1980).
38. As one court stated:
When the court in Griffin suggested that [class-based animus] might suffice to activate the
Ku Klux Klan Act, it did not intend to sweep into that Act any conspiracy that was aimed
at two or more people with a single common trait. If the statute were that panoramic, then
a conspiracy directed at pedestrians who walk on a certain street, at motorists who drive on
a particular road, or at people who wear blue shirts, would be equally embraced.
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269, 274-75 (E.D. La. 1978), vacated, 648 F.2d 340
(5th Cir. 1981); see also Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1975); Note,
supra note 26, at 646.
39. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 229-30 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajfd., 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1982), revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). According to the
district court, "section 1985(3) is plainly addressed to discrimination which has at its foundation
a 'racial or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus' and that discriminatory animus must be directed towards a definite and discernible class." 461 F. Supp. at 229.
The plaintiffs met this requirement, the court concluded, because they "are members of a discernible class; to wit: nonunion laborers and employers of nonunion laborers." 461 F. Supp. at
230.
The circuit court approved this reasoning and added that even though the legislative history
did not specifically indicate a concern for protection of organized laborers, Congress did "evince
a hearty regard for persons who are victimized because of their political beliefs and associations."
Scott, 680 F.2d at 992. The court observed that organized labor did not exist when the statute
was passed and thus could not have been specifically provided for. An analogous category political associations - did exist, however, and was provided for; therefore, the court reasoned
economic association must also be protected. Scott, 680 F.2d at 991-96.
40. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837-39. See notes 17-22 supra, notes 90-99 infra, and accompanying
text.
41. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-37.
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language occurred in the House rather than the Senate, the Court concluded, "we were aware of [Edmunds'] view in Griffin, and still withheld judgment on the question whether 1985(3) . . . went any farther
than its central concern . . . . Lacking other evidence of congressional intention, we follow the same course here. " 42
By rejecting the district court's concept of economically delineated
classes and by eschewing reliance upon the one passage from section
1985(3)'s legislative history that is most supportive of a broad category
of protected classes (the remarks of Senator Edmunds), the Supreme
Court has foreclosed further use of the "clearly defined group" approach or any other approach that delineates an equally broad scope
for section 1985(3).
B. Immutable Characteristics/Historically Pervasive Discrimination
The Third Circuit has limited section 1985(3)'s protection to
groups possessing "immutable characteristics" and/or to groups that
have been victims of "historically pervasive discrimination. " 43 This
formula was first enunciated in the Third Circuit's opinion in Novotny
v. Great American Savings & Loan Association. 44 The "immutable
characteristics" strand was culled from the Supreme Court's decision
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 45 where a plurality46 held that legislative
gender classifications are inherently suspect and therefore must be subject to elevated fourteenth amendment equal protection scrutiny.47
In Novotny, the Third Circuit applied section 1985(3) to women
and their supporters, seizing on the observation in Frontiero that sex,
like race and alienage, is an "immutable characteristic" that usually
has no relation to an individual's abilities.48 To discriminate against
an individual because of such "immutable characteristics," the circuit
court argued, is to act with "an invidious discriminatory animus" contrary to section 1985(3).49 Courts in the Third Circuit have used
42. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837 (citation omitted).
43. See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978),
revd. on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Schnabel v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 563
F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (nonunion employees not protected); Horne v. Farrell, 560 F.
Supp. 219 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (unrepresented litigants not protected).
44. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). See also note
15 supra. Based on this formula, the circuit court expanded § 1985(3) protection to women and
their political supporters.
45. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
46. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall supported elevated scrutiny of sex-based
classifications. Justice Stewart concurred without reaching the level-of-scrutiny question. 411
U.S. at 677.
47. 411 U.S. at 688 ("[W]e can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
48. Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687).
49. Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243.
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this language from the circuit court opinion in Novotny to extend section 1985(3)'s protection to groups possessing "immutable
characteristics. " 50
The "historically pervasive discrimination" strand of the Third
Circuit's formula also flows from language in the circuit court's
Novotny decision. However, unlike the "immutable characteristics"
strand, there is little indication that the court intended to make "historically pervasive discrimination" a guideline to the scope of section
1985(3). The circuit court's sole allusion to the phrase was no more
than a passing reference: "The fact that a person bears no responsibility for gender, combined with the pervasive discrimination practiced
against women, and the emerging rejection of sexual stereotyping as
incompatible with our ideals of equality convince us that . . . an animus directed against women includes the elements of a 'class-based
invidiously discriminatory' motivation." 51 Despite its unsteady foundation, "historically pervasive discrimination" has emerged as a guideline in a number of subsequent Third Circuit decisions. 52
The Third Circuit's approach is troublesome. First, no legislative
history was cited in Novotny to support these categories. 53 Indeed,
there is substantial legislative history indicating that the Third Circuit
approach is far too narrow. As several courts54 and commentators55
have pointed out, there is evidence that the statute was originally
designed to protect not only blacks but also their political "sympathizers,"56 namely the reconstructionist Republicans. This latter group
would be excluded under the Third Circuit's approach. 57
50. See, e.g., Carchman v. Korman Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.) (tenant organizers not
protected), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J.
1983) (Germans not protected despite having "immutable characteristics" because they were not
victims of"historically pervasive discrimination"), affd., 110 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985); Banghart
v. Sun Oil Co., 542 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (individual issued "writs of possession" not
protected).
51. Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243 (footnotes omitted).
52. See cases cited in note 43 supra and note 68 infra. See also Carchman v. Korman Corp.,
594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1983), affd., 710
F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985); Banghart v. Sun Oil Co., 542 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Two
strands of the "historically pervasive"/"immutable characteristics" doctrine have emerged. One
approach requires plaintiffs to show that they possess both "immutable characteristics" and that
they have been victims of "historically pervasive discrimination." See Hauptmann, 510 F. Supp.
at 386. A second approach requires establishment of only one of the two criteria. See Schnabel
v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 563 F. Supp. 1030, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
53. Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243. This is not to say that there is no legislative history to sup·
port a relatively broad scope for § 1985(3). See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983); Keating v. Carey,
706 F.2d 377, 387 (2d Cir. 1983); Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347 n.9 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981).
55. See Comment, supra note 3, at 407-11; Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil
Rights: McLe//an v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 HARV. L. REV. 1721, 1728 n.47 (1977);
see generally notes 87-89 infra.
56. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1983).
57. See Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243.
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Second, it is arguable that the precedent-starved lower courts
within the Third Circuit have applied the Novotny principles far beyond their intended scope. The appellate court in Novotny explicitly
limited its discussion of section 1985(3) to the coverage of women,
stating "[w]e need not determine what classes other than those distinguished by race or gender may be within the ambit of section
1985(3)." 58 Yet trial courts have applied the Novotny test to withhold
section 1985(3) protection from other groups, such as tenant organizers, 5 9 Germans, 60 and individuals who are issued writs of
possession. 61
The circuit court, apparently concerned over the widespread misuse of the Novotny principles, recently reiterated that the existence of
"immutable characteristics" is not the definitive yardstick against
which all section 1985(3) claims must be measured. In C & K Coal v.
United Mine Workers, 62 a decision rendered before Scott, the court
noted:
Some of our cases have spoken about immutable characteristics, but in
context these references were merely indications of class characteristics
which should be treated analogously with race. The question whether
the statute protects . . . classes whose members have the requisite immutable characteristics, is an open one in this court. 63

Despite the paucity of legislative support and the Third Circuit's
repudiation of "immutable characteristics"/"historically pervasive
discrimination" as a definitive guideline, this approach has apparently
survived Scott. 64 The majority in Scott neither embraced nor rejected
this approach, limiting its discussion to political and economic ani58. Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243. After ruling that women were protected, the court again
emphasized that it was not formulating definitive guidelines: ''[W]hatever the outer boundaries
of the concept, an animus directed against women [is actionable under section 1985(3)]." 584
F.2d at 1243 (emphasis added).
59. See Carchman v. Korman Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898
(1979).
60. See Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1983), affd., 770 F.2d 1070 (3d
Cir. 1985).
61. See Banghart v. Sun Oil Co., 542 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
62. 704 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1983).
63. 704 F.2d at 700 (dictum).
64. On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to endorse the Third Circuit approach in Novotny.
The only discussion of the class-based animus requirement in the Supreme Court's Novotny opinion occurred in the dissent:
Although Griffin v. Breckenridge did not reach the issue whether discrimination on a
basis other than race may be vindicated under § 1985(c), the Court correctly assumes that
the answer to this question is "Yes." The statute broadly refers to all privileges and immunities, without any limitations as to the class of persons to whom these rights may be
granted. It is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently invidious to come within the
prohibitions of§ 1985(c).
Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 389 n.6 (White, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Justice White's characterization of the majority's opinion may not be accurate. Nowhere in their decision does the majority specifically assume or indicate that women are
covered. Furthermore, the concurrences of Justices Powell and Stevens suggest exactly the oppo-
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muses. 65 The approach continues to be applied by district judges in
the Third Circuit. 6 6
C. Equal Protection/Political Association Analysis
1.

The Fourteenth Amendment Reference

A third approach, founded upon the language and purpose of the
statute, looks to traditional fourteenth amendment equal protection
analysis to determine the scope of section 1985(3). 67 The statute
speaks of deprivations of "equal protection of the laws" and "equal
privileges and immunities under the law." 68 These phrases were purposefully culled from the fourteenth amendment. 69 Similarly, the
original title of the act was "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . . " 70 These facts have led several courts
to agree with the proposition advanced by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Browder v. Tipton that71 "[t]he distinction between classes
protected by section 1985(3) and those that are unprotected must be
rooted somewhere in traditional equal protection analysis." 72
site - that women are not protected by § 1985(3) from private conspiracies to deprive them of
their civil rights. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 381, 385 (Stevens and Powell, JJ., concurring).
65. Scott, 463 U.S. at 834-39. The four dissenters in Scott - Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and O'Connor - implicitly rejected the "immutable characteristic" approach as too
narrow:
Congress intended to provide a remedy to any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations
placed them in danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from local authorities.
While certain class traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin per se meet this
requirement, other traits also may implicate the functional concerns in other situations.
Scott, 463 U.S. at 853. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun's suggestion that "other traits," such as membership in economic and polit·
ical classes, should be considered in delineating § 1985(3) is contrary to the Third Circuit's
approach.
66. See Skadegaard v. Farrel, 578 F. Supp. 1209, 1220 n.8 (D.N.J. 1984); Hauptmann v.
Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 385-86 (D.N.J. 1983), ajfd., 110 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985). At least
one district court in the Third Circuit has denied members of economic classes § 1985(3) protection because they neither possessed "immutable characteristics" nor were victims of "historically
pervasive discrimination." See Schnabel v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 563 F. Supp.
1030, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Cf. Carchman v. Korman, 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979) (tenant
organizers not protected).
67. See, e.g., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 1981); Browder v.
Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,
332-33 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869, 881-83 (E.D.
Mich. 1983).
68. 42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) (1982).
69. See CoNG. GLOBE, supra note 3, at 477-78; see also, Note, Federal Civil Action, supra
note 3, at 1468-69 ("equal protection" language was inserted as a political compromise to confine
the statute to deprivations of the rights of "American citizens" protected by the fourteenth
amendment).
70. See CoNG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 263; see also CONG. GLOBE, supra note 3, at
459 (statement of Rep. Coburn).
71. 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1980).
72. Browder, 630 F.2d at 1152.
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In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 73 the Court derived the class-based animus requirement from the statute's "equal protection" language as a
means of clarifying what it perceived as a legislative intent to narrow
the scope of potentially protected classes.74 It is only a minor extension of the Griffin Court's reasoning to infer a legislative intent that
the statute be construed by reference to judicial constructions of the
same language in the fourteenth amendment. 75 One commentator has
observed that the author of the fourteenth amendment's "equal protection" language, John Bingham, viewed that language as "broad, not
narrow; general, not specific; open-ended, not limited. Unless Bingham is to be entirely discounted, his framing also counsels that the text
... is constitutional in scope, not statutory in precision."76
Accordingly, courts adopting this approach have generally treated
the scope of section 1985(3)'s protection as coextensive with those
groups who merit "heightened scrutiny" standards of equal protection
analysis. 77 Under this approach, falsely arrested picket-line cross73. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
74. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02. Although the Supreme Court has alluded to the peculiar
difficulty of interpreting the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act, see Scott, 463 U.S. at
836·38 (recognizing that legislative history exists supporting both narrow and broader readings
of the statute); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) C"rrlhe limits of[§ 1985(3)] were
not spelled out in debate."), the legislative intent is not entirely obscure. It is possible, for example, to distinguish between the quite specific motives for promulgating the statute and the more
sweeping descriptions of its intended scope. As the literally hundreds of pages of debate describing Ku Klux Klan activities show, the sponsors of the bill were motivated by a desire to use the
powers arising under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to provide a federal remedy for blacks and
reconstructionist Republicans whose fundamental political rights had been denied by the Klan.
See Scott, 463 U.S. at 839-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gressman, supra note 2, at 1334; Comment, supra note 3, at 418; Comment, supra note 55, at 1728 n.47. See generally CONG. GLOBE,
App., supra note 3, at 69.
Remarks during the debate directly addressed to the intended scope of the protection, on the
other hand, generally accord the statute much broader coverage than would be necessary simply
to provide a remedy for Ku Klux Klan conspiracies. It was said, for example, that
The proposed legislation is not intended to be partisan in its beneficient operations. It is not
to protect Republicans only in their property, liberty, and lives, but Democrats as well, not
the colored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and children, all races and all classes,
will be benefited alike, because we are simply contending for good government and righteous
laws.
CoNG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 190 (statement of Rep. Buckley). See also id. at 567
(statement of Sen. Edmunds) (quoted in text accompanying note 36 supra). While providing
little precise guidance to § 1985(3)'s intended scope, such remarks do establish that its scope was
to be significantly more broad and flexible than the immediate motivation for passing the act
might otherwise imply.
75. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); United States v. Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
76. Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the
Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462,
494 (1982) (footnote omitted); see also Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of ''Equal
Protection of the Laws'~ 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131, 168-69 (1950); note 118 infra (discussing the
commingling of statutory and constitutional principles of interpretation).
77. See Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (6th Cir. 1980); see also In re Jackson
Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp.,
541 F. Supp. 479, 485-86 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,
333 (9th Cir. 1979). Cf Perrotta v. Irizarry, 430 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (S.D.N.Y.) (§ 1985(3)
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ers, 78 homosexuals, 79 and labor union supporters80 have been denied
section 1985(3) protection. Given current interpretations of the equal
protection clause, protected classes would include those based on
race, 81 national origin, 82 gender, 83 alienage, 84 and illegitimacy. 85
2. Broadened Scope -

Political Association

The relatively narrow construction afforded section 1985(3) under
the equal protection approach has led several courts advocating it to
add a second category of protected classes. This second category protects individuals who are discriminated against because of their political beliefs or associations. 86
Substantial legislative history exists to support this classification.
Much of the House debate over section 1985(3) centered on the political activities of the Ku Klux Klan that were designed to prevent reconstructionist Republicans from exercising any influence over local
or state government. 87 Republican supporters of the bill largely
viewed the Ku Klux Klan as a broad-based political organization that
used systematic violence to insure continued Democratic control over
the South. 88 Section 1985(3) was seen in part as a way to insure that
protection limited to racial bias, national origin, or religion), ajfd., 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977);
Western Telecasters v. California Fedn. of Labor, 415 F. Supp. 30, 33 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (animus
behind conspiratorial actions must be akin to racial bias).
78. See Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1153 (6th Cir. 1980).
79. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
80. See Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479, 486 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
81. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
82. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
83. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); see also Stathos v. Bowden, 728
F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984); Scott v. City ofOverland Park, 595 F. Supp. 520, 528-29 (D. Kan. 1984).
84. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
85. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
86. See, e.g., Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 993 (5th Cir. 1982), revd. on other grounds sub
nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983); Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648
F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981); In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO
Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.
Mich. 1982). The court in Jackson Lockdown suggested that "[p]risoners as a class might well be
considered a 'discrete and insular minority.'" 568 F. Supp. at 883 n.14. The court went on to
rule that prisoners did in fact meet the class-based animus requirement, but on a collateral theory. 568 F. Supp. at 884-85. The "political association" approach has been advocated by several
courts not adopting equal protection analysis of§ 1985(3). See Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377,
384-86 (2d Cir. 1983); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
958 (1976); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 912 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930
(1975); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973).
87. See Comment, supra note 55, at 1728 (legislative history behind§ 1985(3) points unmistakably to the conclusion that discrimination on the basis of political beliefs was intended to be
actionable); see also Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 331 (1967); Comment, supra note 3.
88. See note 87 supra. See also CONG. GLOBE, supra note 3, at 321-22 (statement of Rep.
Stoughton); 391 (statement of Rep. Elliot); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., App. 372 (1872)
(statement of Rep. Blair).
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proponents of reconstructionist policies would have continued access
to the Southern political system. 89 Thus, it is arguable that one of the
primary purposes of section 1985(3) was to protect political organizations from conspiracies to deny them equal protection.
The Scott decision gravely weakens the "political association" approach, as is apparent from the Supreme Court's critique of the logic
used by the Fifth Circuit in upholding the nonunion workers' cause of
action. The circuit court, citing extensive legislative history, first concluded that "the legislative history [of the Ku Klux Klan Act] reflects
a pervasive concern for people discriminated against because of their
political associations." 90 The Fifth Circuit then analogized the position of nonunion laborers to that of political associations, concluding
that "an animus directed against nonunion association is closely akin
to animus directed against political association." 91 This close "kinship" between the two groups, combined with the legislature's "pervasive concern" over political organization, led the court to conclude
that statutory protection was warranted for both groups.
Even though the Supreme Court did not specifically reject the
"political conspiracy" approach, it voiced strong reservations about
extending section 1985(3) protection to "non-racial . . . politically
motivated conspiracies."92 After "closely examining" the legislative
history, the Court concluded that it was a "difficult" question whether
section 1985(3) covered conspiracies aimed at political groups. 93 To
so rule, the Court stated, "would go far towards making the federal
courts . . . the monitors of campaign tactics . . . a role that the courts
should not be quick to assume." 94 Although the Supreme Court's discussion of this issue was dicta, 95 lower courts applying Scott have been
reluctant to expand section 1985(3) protection to political groups.96
As a result, the more viable version of the "equal protection analysis"
approach is that which limits the scope of section 1985(3) to classes
89. See notes 87 & 88 supra. Several courts have used this legislative history to support
extending § 1985(3) protection to political groups active in civil rights. See Hobson v. Wilson,
737 F.2d 1, 20-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909, 937 (M.D.N.C.
1984).
90. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 994 (5th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
91. Scott, 680 F.2d at 994.
92. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836.
93. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836.
94. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836.
95. The Court based its final decision on the ground that there was no legislative history to
support the notion that the legislature was concerned with protecting economic groups. Scott,
463 U.S. at 837-39.
96. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Grimes v. Smith, 585 F. Supp.
1084, 1089-92 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909, 937-38 (M.D.N.C.
1984).
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given heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause, rather
than the broader version that also embraces political association.
II. TIME

FOR A DECISION

By discrediting the broad "clearly definable group" and "political
association" 97 approaches, the Scott decision favors a narrower construction for the scope of section 1985(3). Thus, the narrow "immutable characteristics"/"historically pervasive discrimination" and
"equal protection analysis" approaches are currently the only viable
tests remaining to define the scope of the class-based animus
requirement. 98
Of these two alternative constructions the "equal protection analysis" approach is the more defensible. Although Third Circuit courts,
in the absence of more definitive guidelines, continue to apply the "immutable characteristics"/"historically pervasive discrimination"
test, 9 9 that approach has no clear basis in the language 100 or legislative
history101 of the statute, and arose in a case in which fourteenth
amendment principles were borrowed to determine whether the statute covers gender-based discrimination. 102 While the "equal protec97. Political associations that are subject to conspiratorial discriminatory animuses because
of their support for blacks or other racial groups arguably still fall within the statute. See note 89

supra.
98. Arguably, there is only one distinct approach, because courts using the "immutable characteristics"/"historically pervasive" approach are applying language derived from the Supreme
Court's fourteenth amendment equal protection decisions. "Immutable characteristics," for ex·
ample, was culled from the Supreme Court's decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973), extending elevated scrutiny to sex-based classifications. See notes 44-49 supra and
accompanying text; see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1126-27 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Developments] (special treatment for racial classifications can be explained in part by the
idea that race and lineage are congenital and unalterable traits over which individuals have no
control and for which they should receive neither blame nor reward). "Historically pervasive
discrimination" similarly flows from the Supreme Court's observation in Frontiero that "[t]here
can be no doubt that our nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sexual discrimination." 411 U.S. at 684. The "discrete and insular minority" language traces back to the famous
"footnote 4" in United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1934).
In practical terms, however, the two approaches are slightly different. One can envisage an
ethnic group that would receive fourteenth amendment strict scrutiny protection, but would fail
the "immutable characteristic"/"historically pervasive discrimination" test. In Hauptmann v.
Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1983), ajfd., 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985), for example, the
district court denied protection to Germans as a class because they were never victims of historically pervasive discrimination. This conflicts with a number of fourteenth amendment equal
protection decisions focusing on national origin as a basis for heightened scrutiny. See Keyes v.
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1943). See
generally Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1976); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & ]. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 623-39 (2d. ed. 1983),
99. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 98 supra (showing that source of "immutable characteristics"/"historically
pervasive discrimination" language is modern Supreme Court equal protection decisions).
101. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 44-51 supra and accompanying text.
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tion analysis" approach probably dictates the same result with respect
to gender classes, 103 it does so by a direct reference to statutory language and a reasonable inference with respect to legislative intent,
namely that the language borrowed from the fourteenth amendment is
to be construed in the light of well-established judicial constructions of
that amendment. This approach thus provides a sounder foundation,
and clearer guidance, for future applications of the statute.
As applied by the courts that have adopted it, the equal protection
approach would extend section 1985(3) protection to any group the
Supreme Court recognizes as needing the extra protection of elevated
scrutiny analysis.1 04
Such an approach is certainly not revolutionary. As stated previously, several courts have adopted this position. 105 Several others
103. See note 83 supra and accompanying text; cf. note 64 supra (reviewing the disparate
views on § 1985(3)'s coverage of women expressed in Novotny).
104. This approach raises a question of whether§ 1985(3) protection should be extended to
cover conspiracies against individuals defined by their common exercise of "fundamental rights."
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (freedom of association); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-70 (1966) (right to vote and participate in the political process); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right to privacy).
For several reasons, such an expansion should not and probably will not take place. First, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend § 1985(3) protection to members of groups defined
by their economic or political activities, even when these groups were exercising fundamental
rights (participation in the political process and freedom of association). See notes 92-96 supra
and accompanying text. Thus, class members must share more than the common exercise of
fundamental rights to fall within the ambit of the statute. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1983); see also Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Moreover, the class must exist independently of the defendants' actions; that is, it cannot be
defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action."). Cf. Taylor v. Brighton, 616 F.2d
256, 264-65 (6th Cir. 1980) (employees discriminated against because of the exercise of "their
constitutionally and statutorily protected rights to bring safety violations to the attention of
OSHA, file race discrimination charges with governmental agencies, belong to a union, and to be
free of retaliatory discrimination for having exercised any of the foregoing rights" not protected
because "they assert membership in a class defined solely by the conduct of its members").
Second, such an approach fails to distinguish between the textual sources of the fundamental
rights and the source of the class-based animus requirement. The class-based animus requirement is derived from language culled from the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
See notes 3 & 8 supra. The equal protection clause is also the basis for the special protections
accorded to members of suspect classes. See notes 81-85 supra and accompanying text. Fundamental rights, on the other hand, have been derived primarily from "penumbras" emanating
from various constitutional provisions, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to privacy), or from specific constitutional clauses, see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association derived from the first amendment). Thus,
even though fundamental rights are employed in equal protection jurisprudence, they are not
direct progeny of the fourteenth amendment as the suspect classifications are.
Finally, allowing the classes protected to be defined by the substantive right being infringed
would largely defeat the purpose of the class-based animus requirement. In Griffin, the Court
instituted the class-based animus requirement as a way of limiting the statute's protection to a
smaller group than that of all individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by conspirators. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1972). To the extent that the explicit
protections of the Constitution are "fundamental," adopting the fundamental rights approach
would allow a plaintiff to fall within the ambit of§ 1985(3) merely by making out a substantive
violation, regardless of whether that violation was motivated by a class-based animus.
105. See note 77 supra.
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have adopted the underlying themes of equal protection heightened
scrutiny analysis. 106
Aside from this precedent and its grounding in the language and
history of section 1985(3), the equal protection approach is a plausible
construction for other reasons. First, similar governmental interests
underlie both the statute and fourteenth amendment equal protection
analysis. As the Supreme Court107 and commentators1os have pointed
out a number of times, one of the primary considerations in extending
strict scrutiny protection to groups under the fourteenth amendment
has been their inability to cultivate "equal access to those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." 109 Similarly, this lack of access to fundamental political protections for blacks
and Republicans during the Reconstruction era was the primary concern of the authors of section 1985(3). 110 As stated by the Supreme
Court, "[t]he central theme of the bill's proponents was that the Klan
and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and
give them equal access to political power." 111
Nor would this be the first civil rights statute interpreted by reference to the fourteenth amendment. This same kind of fourteenth
amendment/statutory tie has been employed by the Sixth Circuit112 to
construe another Reconstruction era statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 113
Like section 1985(3), section 1981 was implemented to protect the
fundamental rights of the newly emancipated slaves. 114 According to
the Sixth Circuit, "[t]he Statute . . . has a close relationship to the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . What the Constitution forbids generally, § 1981 forbids with specificity. The constitutional genesis of
§ 1981 also means that what the Constitution permits, § 1981 must
106. See note 98 supra.
107. See, e.g., San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (denying
strict scrutiny analysis because the members of plaintiff's class "have none of the traditional
indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process"); United States
v. Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1934).
108. See generally Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
422-23 (1959); Developments, supra note 98, at 1067.
109. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1934).
110. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
111. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983); see also Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th Cir.
1979), modified on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
112. See Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 692 (6th Cir. 1979); see also
Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 175 (6th Cir. 1983); Marsh v. Board of Educ., 581
F. Supp. 614, 619 (E.D. Mich. 1984), ajfd., 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985).
113. This section was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
It was subsequently readopted in 1870 after the passage of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. See Gressman, supra note 2, at 1329-34.
114. See Gressman, supra note 2, at 1331-34.

October 1985]

Note -

Class-Based Animus Requirement

105

also permit." 115 The same approach was taken in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 116 in which a majority of the Supreme
Court used fourteenth amendment equal protection principles in determining what groups are protected by title VI. 117
One possible objection to the equal protection approach 118 is that
115. Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 692 (6th Cir. 1979).
116. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). As Justice Powell observed:
The concept of "discrimination," like the phrase "equal protection of the laws" is susceptible of varying interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, "[a] word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." We
must, therefore, seek whatever aid is available in determining the precise meaning of the
statute before us.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted).
117. 438 U.S. at 281-87. The statutory interpretation problem in Bakke was sinrilar to that
presented by § 1985(3). The Court observed that "the language of§ 601, 78 Stat. 252, like that
of the Equal Protection Clause, is majestic in its sweep • . . ." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 270. Similarly, Justice Powell ruled that the legislative intent was "clear" only because, while
isolated statements of various legislators, taken out of context, can be marshaled in support
of the proposition that § 601 enacted a purely color-blind scheme, without regard to the
reach of the Equal Protection Clause, these comments must be read against the background
of both the problem that Congress was addressing and the broader view of the statute that
emerges from a full exantination of the legislative debates.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284-85 (footnote omitted).
Justice Stevens argued, on the other hand, that the Act was "colorblind" because "nothing in
the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad language of § 601 should not be
given its natural meaning." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Note that both title VI and title VII go beyond the fourteenth amendment in proscribing
discriminatory conduct. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2 (1982) (discrimination against pregnant individual not proscribed by the
fourteenth amendment, but made illegal by statute). This is particularly true because title VI and
title VII reach purely private conduct. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 417 n.20 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
However, for two reasons, expanding the scope of § 1985(3) beyond the scope of the fourteenth amendment in a similar manner is not logical. First, title VI and title VII are based on
both the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(6) (1982) (defining the scope of coverage of title VII in terms of industries "affecting commerce"); Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) enacted pursuant to congressional authority under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment). Second, there is clear legislative history behind title VI and title VII supporting the idea that they were intended to have a broader
scope than the fourteenth amendment. No such legislative history exists for § 1985(3).
118. An interrelated problem with the equal protection approach, in the view of several
lower courts, is that it is an unwarranted commingling of principles of statutory and constitutional construction. See Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1601 (1984); Marsh v. Board of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 614, 618-20 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), ajfd., 762 F.2d 1009 (1985). These critiques are apparently based on the idea that
the Constitution should be liberally construed and that courts should look to a variety of sources
beyond precedent and the history surrounding enactment to interpret the meaning of constitutional provisions. See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (contemporaneous
sources should be referred to in interpreting the Constitution); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898) (debates at Constitutional Convention not controlling); Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust, 157 U.S. 429, 556-86 (1894) (the courts should refer to historical circumstance,
the frame and scheme of the instrument, and the consequence of one construction over another).
Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908) (introduction of the "Brandeis brier• citing sociological and scientific data). On the other hand, attempts to interpret § 1985(3), these courts
argue, should "focus . . . solely on the intent of the 1871 drafters and on higher court interpretative decisions" Marsh, 581 F. Supp. at 618-19 (footnote omitted).
While an in-depth discussion of the tenets of statutory and constitutional interpretation is
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the Supreme Court has already refused to hobble section 1985(3) with
the fourteenth amendment's state action requirement. 119 In both Griffin120 and Scott 121 the Court ruled that section 1985(3) is not constrained by the same state action requirement as limits the fourteenth
amendment. Why then should section 1985(3)'s class-based animus
requirement be constrained by the fourteenth amendment's heightened
scrutiny principles?
The short answer to this question is that the fourteenth amendment is expressly addressed to states, while section 1985(3) is addressed to "persons." 122 There is no comparable textual distinction
between the fourteenth amendment and section 1985(3) respecting the
classes of people protected. The legislative history of section 1985(3)
reveals a similar discrepancy. Literally hundreds of pages of the congressional debate surrounding section 1985(3) involve discussions of
how the statute's lack of a state action requirement would affect the
balance between federal and state powers. 123 There is no comparable
legislative history elucidating the class-based animus requirement.
Furthermore, the purely remedial 124 nature of the statute suggests
that it should not be constrained by the fourteenth amendment's state
beyond the scope of this Note, several pragmatic counterarguments may be made. First, the
broad language of the statute and its close tie to the fourteenth amendment, see notes 75-76 supra
and accompanying text, suggest that the more liberal tools of constitutional construction are in
order. Second, attempts at traditional statutory construction have proven to be inconsistent and
ineffective. See notes 30-96 supra and accompanying text. See also United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 850 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he types of classes covered by the
statute are far from clear. The statutory language is broad . . . yet it is also indefinite . • • •
[t]he Legislative history provides little assistance • . . ."). Finally, the dividing line between
tenets of statutory and constitutional construction is far from definite. See, e.g., Badger v.
Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1937) (rules of statutory construction are applicable to constitutional construction); Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (same), ajfd.
sub nom. Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964). Cf. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 657, 722 (1838) (recognizing that both the Constitution and the laws of the United States
should be construed like other instruments granting power or property).
119. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court upheld a§ 1985(3) claim based on the thirteenth
amendment even though there was no showing of state action. Despite similarities in the Ian·
guage of the statute and the amendment, the Court ruled that there is nothing inherent in
§ 1985(3) "that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the state." 403 U.S.
88, 97 (1972). In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, the Court clarified the state action
requirement by ruling that a litigant must look to the underlying claim being asserted to determine if state action is necessary. 463 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1983). Thus, a thirteenth amendment
claim asserted through § 1985(3) would require no state action because the thirteenth amend·
ment protects individuals from private action. A first amendment§ 1985(3) claim, on the other
hand, would require state action. Section 1985(3) after Scott is not necessarily wed to the fourteenth amendment's state action requirement.
120. 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1972).
121. 463 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1983).
122. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96-101.
123. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 73 (statement of Rep. Blair); 141 (statement of Rep. Shanks); 153 (statement of Rep. Garfield); 382 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger);
395 (statement of Rep. Rainey); 514 (statement of Rep. Poland).
124. See note 16 supra.
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action requirement. As construed by the Supreme Court in Griffin
and Scott, section 1985(3) merely picks up any state action requirements already associated with the underlying constitutional right that
is to be remedied. 125 Since the Supreme Court has already made an
independent determination of whether state action is required for the
constitutional rights that can be remedied by section 1985(3), there is
no reason not to allow those separate judgments to take precedence
over the fourteenth amendment, which provides only one of several
substantive rights enforceable by the statute.
The class-based animus requirement, on the other hand, is a separate requirement, flowing from section 1985(3)'s equal protection and
equal privileges language. 126 With the exception of the fifth, thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments, none of the underlying rights vindicated
by section 1985(3) have a class-based animus requirement. 12 7 The
only other constitutional area in which the Court has distinguished
groups on their "racial or perhaps other class-based" 128 characteristics is in cases receiving heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Thus, it is these decisions that should guide courts in
construing the scope of section 1985(3)'s equal protection language.

III.

CONCLUSION

The class-based animus requirement of section 1985(3) has a long
and tortuous history. Broad language, a massive and meandering legislative history, and a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court have
contributed to arbitrary decisions, uncertainty, and often unworkable
or illogical standards. Underlying the extensive debates surrounding
section 1985(3) is the understanding that the primary purpose of the
statute was to put into effect the protections provided by the newly
enacted fourteenth amendment. 129 That is why the bill was entitled
"An Act to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." 130 The fourteenth amendment is also the source of the broad "equal protection"
language. 131 Thus, section 1985(3) is in one sense nothing more than
an extension of the fourteenth amendment. The many court· decisions
125. See note 119 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 9 & 68-70 supra.
127. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Note, Jones v.
Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1019 (1969).
128. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajfd., 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982),
revd. sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
129. See Gressman, supra note 2, at 1331-36; CONG. GLOBE, App., supra note 3, at 69. Cj
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (discussing§ 1 of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
130. See note 70 supra.
131. See note 69 supra. See also Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 507 (4th Cir.
1974) ("the language of [the] statute simply tracks that of the fourteenth amendment").
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interpreting the fourteenth amendment provide the best indication of
the statute's intended scope.
This approach insures certainty, flexibility, and reliable protection
for the groups the Supreme Court and Congress have recognized as
most needing the benefits of the fourteenth amendment. None of these
crucial attributes has characterized the judicial application of section
1985(3) since the Griffin decision.

- Devin S. Schindler

